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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH'V. McKAY and : 
BETTY McKAY, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 14149 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, : 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a property damage action arising out of 
road construction work undertaken on public domain adjacent 
to the plaintiffs1 residential property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Stewart M- Hanson, Jr., presiding, granted summary judgment 
in favor of respondent Salt Lake City, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants have failed to accurately state the 
undisputed material facts and a restatement of the facts is 
therefore necessary. The parties will hereinafter be 
designated as they appeared in the trial court. 
Plaintiffs are owners of residential property 
located at 1334 East 1st South Street near the University of 
Utah campus in Salt Lake City, Utah. [R. 1] In August, 
1972, Salt Lake City began a remodeling project to widen 
First South Street to accomodate the heavy traffic flow on 
this primary access route to the University campus. [R. 43] 
In order to do so, the City removed landfill, landscaping 
and other improvements, all of which were located on City 
property adjacent to the plaintiffs1 property. [R. 43-44] 
As a result of the construction work and the 
alteration of the grade of First South, the plaintiffs claim 
they were damaged because landscaping adjacent to their 
property was removed, access to their home was impaired and 
the City workers negligently damaged and trespassed upon 
their property during the course of the work. [R. 1-3] 
In order to seek redress of their grievances, the 
plaintiffs met with City Streets Commissioner Stephen Harmsen 
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on October 13, 1972, while the construction work was still 
proceeding. [R. 45] They informed him of their complaints 
and, in particular,, suggested that the City construct a 
decorative retaining wall adjacent to their property in place 
of the proposed wall planned by city engineers. [R. 44] The 
plaintiffs also wanted to construct, at their expense, a new 
stairway which would encroach upon City property. According 
to the plaintiffs, Commissioner Harmsen expressed concern 
and his belief that the City might be able to accomodate their 
wishes. [R. 45] 
Since the decorative wall and stairway requested 
by the plaintiffs were to be constructed on city property, 
Commissioner Harmsen advised them to submit architectural 
drawings for consideration by the City commission and the City 
Engineer. [R. 45] The plaintiffs did so and, although the 
City refused to pay for a brick facing on the wall, Commissioner 
Harmsen informed the plaintiffs that their wall would be 
built and, subject to acquiring insurance, they could build 
the stairway which would encroach upon City property. [R. 45] 
On February 22, 1973, as the street remodeling project 
was nearly completed, the City began construction of the 
retaining wall adjacent to the city's sidewalk as it had 
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been originally designed by the City engineer, [R. 45] When 
they discovered this fact, the plaintiffs halted the work and 
immediately contacted commissioner Harmsen to complain about 
the City's obvious change of heart. [R. 45-46] Commissioner 
Harmsen investigated the matter and on February 23, 1973, he 
informed the plaintiffs of the city's position* [R. 46] 
According to the plaintiffs, Harmsen advised them 
that the City had decided to complete the street project as 
originally designed with a cement retaining wall adjacent to 
the city sidewalk, rather than adjacent to the plaintiffs1 
property.. [R. 46] However, if the plaintiffs wished, the 
City was willing to pay them $2,400.00 and the plaintiffs 
could build a decorative wall of their choice next to the 
sidewalk, provided it conformed to the City's specifications. 
[R. 46] The plaintiffs were also advised that they could build 
their stairway/ but no other offers were extended, inferred 
or contemplated. 
The road construction project originally causing 
the plaintiffs' complaints was completed in March, 1973. 
[R. 44] 
After receiving the City's final offer on February 23, 
1973, the plaintiffs took no action to assert their claim for 
over five months until August, 1973, when they contacted an 
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attorney, [R. 46-47] A written notice of claim was finally 
filed on September 28, 1973, over seven, months after Commissioner 
Harmsen had advised the plaintiffs of the City's final offer. 
[R. 47] 
Whatever the effect negotiations may have had on 
the plaintiffs' claim, if any existed, prior to February, 1973, 
the trial court held that there were no facts reasonably 
indicating that the City induced or encouraged the plaintiffs 
to delay prosecuting their claim after February 23, 1973. 
Since the plaintiffs failed to file a timely notice of claim 
after that date, the court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant, no cause of action. (R. 58-60] 
ARGUMENT • 
POINT I: THE PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS FOR DEPRECIATION 
OF PROPERTY VALUE ARE BARRED BY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 
The lav; in Utah is irrefutably established that 
governmental entities are immune to suit for damages caused 
in the performance of governmental functions, unless immunity 
is expressly waived by the legislature. Governmental 
immunity has not been waived for plaintiffs' claims for 
depreciation of the value of their property caused by the 
alteration of public property adjacent to their home. 
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In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that the 
value of their property has been depreciated as a consequence 
of the remodeling of First South Street. In particular, the 
plaintiffs claim loss of adjacent lateral support and impair-
ment of access due to alteration of the grade and width of 
the street. In short, the appearance and accessibility of 
their home was damaged by removal of landscaped City property. 
With the adoption of the comprehensive Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act in 1965, the legislature prescribed the 
exclusive means by which claims may be asserted against 
governmental entities for damages caused in the performance 
of governmental functions. Utah code Ann. §63-30-3 (Repl, 
Vol. 1968) states: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for all injury which may result from 
the activities of said entities wherein said 
entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge 
of a governmental function. (Emphasis added) 
in Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941), 
the Court long ago determined that road construction work of 
the kind performed in this case is governmental, rather than 
proprietary, in nature. Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover damages only if the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
so provides. It does not. 
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In Holt v, Utah State Road Commission, 3 0 Utah 2d 4, 
511'P.2d 1286 (1973), this Court applied the Governmental 
Immunity Act in a situation virtually identical to the instant 
case and held the defendant immune. In Holt, the owners of 
property on the corner of an intersection sought damages 
caused by the construction of an underpass which lowered the 
grade of the street and impaired access to the plaintiff's 
property. Citing Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3, the Court observed: 
This seems to indicate an intention that the 
act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign 
immunity; and to waive it only as clearly expressed 
therein. 511 P.2d at 1288. 
Turning to the only conceivable provision of the Act that 
could arguably permit a suit for depreciation of property 
value as a result of impaired access to property, the Court 
held: ,:. 
It is our opinion that reading Section 6 
in the light of that rule, the waiver of 
immunity from suit ,ffor the recovery of any 
property real or personal or for the possession 
thereof" cannot be construed to include an 
action of this character to recover damages 
for inconvenience of access to property....Id. 
In view of the unequivocal language of Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-3 and the clear intent of the legislature in 
consolidating the law of governmental immunity into one act, 
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the plaintiffs in the instant case are not entitled to a 
recovery of damages. No constitutional provision requires 
compensation to landowners whose access to and value of 
property are adversely affected by road construction work. 
As the Court stated in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 
10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (I960), in a case where land-
owners sought damages for depreciation of the value of their 
property caused by road construction work: 
As to [damages for depreciation in preventing 
access], consistently and historically we have 
ruled that the State may not be sued without 
its consent; taken the view that Art. I, Sec. 
22 of our Constitution is not self-executing, 
nor does it give consent to be sued, implied 
or otherwise; and that to secure such consent 
is a legislative matter.... 354 P.2d at 105. 
It is also clear that Commissioner Harmsen's 
representations cannot waive governmental immunity preserved 
by the Act for the damages allegedly caused by loss of adjacent 
lateral support and convenience of access to the plaintiffs1 
property. In the very recent case of Bailey Service and 
Supply Corp. v. State Road Commission, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah, 
1975), the trial court awarded damages for depreciation of 
property caused by loss of access when the State Road Commission 
allegedly stipulated to a waiver of governmental immunity. Rever 
the Court held that only the legislature can waive sovereign 
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immunity and the Road Commission's attempt to do so was 
without legal effect. The Court concluded: 
Prior decisions of this court have established 
the principle that there can be no recovery 
from the State for damages where the construction 
of the highway or the erection of structures 
within the public right-of-way impair or 
adversely affect the convenience of access to 
the property of an abutting owner. 
533 P.2d at 883. 
In support of their claim for recovery of damage 
caused by loss of convenient access to their property, 
plaintiffs rely solely upon the case of Hampton v. State 
Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968). In 
Hampton, the Court held that governmental immunity for such 
damage had been waived by Utah Code Ann. §73-11-9 (1953). 
The plaintiffs neglected to add, however, that Utah Code 
Ann. §78-11-9 was repealed in 1971 and that the subsequent 
decisions of this Court have extinguished whatever vitality 
the Hampton decision once had. 
In summary, the plaintiffs' claims for depreciation 
of the value of their property are barred by sovereign 
immunity. It is not disputed that the changes in the grade 
and width of First South Street were made in the public 
interest. In order to accomplish this project, it was 
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necessary to remove landscaped city property and improvements 
adjacent to the plaintiffs' property and to thereby alter 
lateral support and convenience of access. In recognition 
of public necessity, however, the legislature has retained 
the governmental immunity which bars the plaintiffs' claim 
for consequential damages. 
Consequently, the Court should affirm the judgment 
of the court below. 
POINT II. THE PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS ARE BARRED 
BY THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT, 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Salt Lake 
City negligently removed lateral support of the plaintiffs' 
property and negligently damaged landscaping and improvements 
in the course of the road construction project. The trial 
court correctly held that these claims as well as those 
previously discussed are barred because the plaintiffs failed 
to file a notice of claim within the time prescribed by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
A prerequisite to maintaining an action for damages 
against a political subdivision of the State of Utah is 
compliance with the statutory notice requirements set forth 
in the Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 
(Repl. Vol. 1968) provides, in its relevant part: 
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A claim against a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is 
filed within 90 days after the cause of 
action arises..., 
A "political subdivision" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-2 to mean any city. 
In a long line of cases this Court has consistently 
and resolutely adhered to its conviction that strict compliance 
with the notice provisions is a prerequisite to maintaining 
any action against a governmental entity. As stated in 
Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972): 
Inasmuch as the maintenance of such a cause 
of action derives from such statutory authority, 
a prerequisite thereto is meeting the conditions 
prescribed in this statute. A party seeking to 
obtain the benefit thereof should not be entitled 
to claim the favorable aspects which confer the 
rights, and disavow the conditions upon which 
the rights are predicated. 492 P.2d at 1337. 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs filed a written 
notice of claim on September 25, 1973, nearly one year after 
meeting with Commissioner Harmsen in October, 1972, to complain 
about their damages. Their notice of claim states that all 
damages were incurred during 1972 and no basis for the delay 
in presenting their claim was stated therein. 
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In response to Salt Lake City's motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, plaintiffs alleged that commissioner Harmsen 
induced them to delay filing their claim. Plaintiffs now cite 
this court's decision in Rice v. Granite School District, 
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969) in support of their contention. 
In the instant case, however, the trial court correctly held 
that the Rice decision is wholly distinguishable from the facts 
of this lawsuit and that a different result is warranted. 
In Rice, the plaintiff submitted a formal claim to 
the school district and, thereafter, was contacted by an 
insurance adjuster who had statutory authority to accept or 
deny claims against the governmental entity. The adjuster 
reassured the plaintiff that the school district admitted all 
responsibility for her injuries and would pay all expenses 
as soon as they had been determined. Although she attempted 
to settle the claim on several occasions, the plaintiff was 
told that a settlement could not be made until she had been 
released by her treating physician. While the plaintiff 
patiently waited for a release from her physician, the 
statutory period for filing a lawsuit elapsed and the plaintiff's 
claim was denied. The Court correctly held that the delay in 
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prosecuting the plaintiff's claim was unfairly induced by the 
adjuster and that the school district was equitably estopped 
from alleging the limitations defense. 
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from 
Rice for several reasons. First, Commissioner Harmsen had no 
statutory authority to authorize a compromise of the plaintiffs1 
claim and, therefore, the City could not be estopped by his 
actions. In Rice, the Court emphasized the importance of the 
status of the insurance carrier under the Governmental 
Immunity Act and stated: 
The insurance carrier is specifically authorized 
to approve or deny a claim; therefore, we are 
not confronted by a fact situation wherein the 
agent's 
and the 
act 
gov 
estopped to 
ions we 
ernment. 
assert 
re 
al 
no 
en 
the 
u a 
4_ -J 4~ 
L 1 L 
sta 
utho. rized 
7 could 
tute of. 
by statute 
not be 
1; Imitations. 
456 P.2d at 161 (Emphasis added) 
Since the Governmental Immunity Act vests authority to settle 
claims only in the governmental entity, in this case the Board 
of City Commissioners, or its insurance carrier, Commissioner 
Harmsen was acting without authority and his individual actions 
cannot constitute an estoppel against the City/ 
Second, in Rice, the plaintiff was instructed to 
delay taking action until her damages could be ascertained 
at which time, she was told, a settlement offer would be made/ 
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In the instant case, however, the Cicy did not request or 
require inaction by the plaintiffs. To the contrary, on 
February 23, 1973, the City made its final offer and the r 
plaintiffs had an opportunity to either accept it or to 
prosecute their claims according to the statute. Their 
inaction for nearly seven months thereafter is clearly not 
attributable to any action or inducement by the City, 
Finally, it is well established that the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked unless the plaintiff 
exercises due diligence in commencing the appropriate legal 
proceeding after the circumstances giving rise to estoppel 
have ceased to be operational. See, Annotation/ Plaintiff's 
Diligence as Affecting his Right to have Defendant Estopped 
from Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 44 A.L.JR. 3d 760 
(1972). In the instant case, the plaintiffs were notified 
on February 23, 1973, that the City refused to grant their 
request for a decorative wall and, instead, intended to proceed 
to a completion of the road project as it had originally been 
designed. No other promises or representations were made. 
Whatever effect prior negotiations may have had on the 
limitations period, from that day forward the plaintiffs were 
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required to exercise due diligence in commencing the 
appropriate legal proceedings* Their failure to take 
action within 90 days cannot be attributable to any deception, 
inducement, promises or misrepresentation by the City. 
Consequently, the claims alleged in plaintiffs' 
complaint are forever barred and the plaintiffs are not 
entitled to a recovery* 
As the Court stated in State v. Tanner, 30 Utah 2d 
19, 512 P.2d 1022 (1973), where land owners claimed tortious 
interference with water rights caused by construction of a 
highway: 
The claim for compensation for this waste water 
being one sounding ex maleficio...defendants, 
if they had any claim at all, should have . 
pursued an action under the Utah act having to 
do with waiver of immunity, which vas not done, 
and which should resolve this case into a 
remand with instructions to vacate the judgment 
relating to this waste water. 512 P.2d at 1023. 
(Emphasis added) 
Since the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that 
plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Court should affirm the 
judgment of the court below. 
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POINT III: THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR TRESPASS 
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
In their second cause of action, the plaintiffs 
sought recovery of special and exemplary damages caused 
by the trespass of Salt Lake City employees upon their 
property during the construction project. The Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act expressly bars recovery of damages caused 
by trespass and expressly bars recovery of punitive or 
exemplary damages. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (Repl. Vol. 1968) waives 
governmental immunity for injury caused by negligent acts of 
governmental employees, but expressly reserves immunity when 
injury is caused by "intentional trespass." While plaintiffs 
characterize the alleged entry of Salt Lake City workmen upon 
their land during the construction activities as merely 
"trespass," the trial court correctly held that such conduct 
must have been "intentional" within the meaning of the statute 
and plaintiffs' claim for relief is therefore barred. The 
legislature clearly intended to retain governmental immunity 
when City employees enter upon the property of others to 
perform governmental functions. 
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The Governmental Immunity Act also prohibits any 
recovery for exemplary or punitive damages, Utah Code Ann, 
§63-30-22 (Repl. Vol. 1968) states: 
No judgment shall be rendered against the 
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive 
damages. 
Consequently, the trial court correctly granted 
judgment against plaintiffs, no cause of action, on their 
claim for general and punitive damages based upon trespass. 
POINT IV: THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH 
. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT APPLICABLE IN 
THIS CASE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, 
Plaintiffs assert that the long standing principles 
of lav; barring their recovery in this case deny their consti-
tutional rights of due process and equal protection. Citing 
cases from the small minority of states where courts have 
abolished sovereign immunity on constitutional grounds or 
"in the interest of justice," they now ask the Court to 
judicially legislate a new system of law. The court should 
refuse to do so. 
In Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 
354 P.2d 105 (I960), the Court considered the constitutional! 
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of sovereign immunity in a case virtually identical to this 
action. The Court correctly held that the United States and 
Utah constitutions are not abridged by this well established 
and long standing phase of our law. Quoting Justice Brandeis 
i n
 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 
1434 (1934), the Court stated: 
11
 [Cjonsent to sue the United States is a 
privilege accorded, not the grant of a 
• property right protected bv the Fifth 
Amendment. . . .The sovereign's immunity from 
suit exists whatever the character of the 
proceeding or source of the right sought to 
be enforced. It applies alike to causes 
of action arising under acts of Congress... 
and to those arising from some violation of 
rights conferred upon the citizen by the 
Constitution....For immunity from suit is 
an attribute of sovereignty which may not 
be bartered away. " 354 P.2d at 106-107. 
(Emphasis in original) 
The Court also held that no provision of the Utah constitution 
permits an action against a sovereign state nor does sovereign 
immunity violate any constitutional provision. 
Since governmental immunity does not offend any 
constitutional right, the Court has wisely reserved to the 
people the choice of how and to what extent immunity shall be 
waived. In Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 
(1961), the Court reaffirmed the validity of sovereign immunity 
and stated: 
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All of the members of this court, at one time 
or another have expressed the elementary 
principle that in cases of similar import we 
must not judicially legislate, but must, in 
.'"-•' " our tri-partite form of government leave to 
the legislature whether there should be a waiver 
of immunity where one of the state's agencies is 
functioning in a governmental capacity, such as 
repairing streets.... 366 P.2d at 988-989. 
(Emphasis added) 
Governmental immunity is a well established and 
vital phase of our law. If it is to be changed, the change 
must come through the sovereign power of the state, the people, 
speaking through the legislature. 
CONCLUSION • 
The principles of law governing the outcome of this 
suit have been frequently litigated and are now well established. 
Abutting land owners are not entitled to recover damage for 
the depreciation of their property occasioned by road construction 
work: adjacent to their property. Removal of landscaped city 
property and city developments which enhanced the value of and 
access to the plaintiffs* home was necessary to accomodate the 
public's need. The legislature has determined that no recovery 
for the consequential private loss is allowed* 
In addition, the plaintiffs' claims for damage to 
their property inflicted during the construction project as 
well as loss of value to the property were lost because they 
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failed to diligently pursue whatever rights they may have 
had. Without inducement, fraud or coercion by the City, 
the plaintiffs deliberated too long before deciding to 
reject the city's offer and to prosecute this claim. 
Accordingly, since there are no disputed issues of 
fact, the trial court correctly interpreted the well established 
law of this state and granted summary judgment against the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. That judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Elliott J. Williams 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor, Continental Bank: Bldg, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ray L. Montgomery 
Assistant City Attorney 
101 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
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